

June 21, 1965

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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Selected retail prices of accessories and optional equipment, 1965 passenger cars, exclude tax at 8 percent of dealer cost included—Continued

CHRYSLER—Con.	
Miscellaneous:	
Accessory groups:	
Basic, Newport and 300...	\$287.70
Safety, Newport.....	45.55
Safety, 300.....	39.35
Custom, Newport 4-door..	75.55
Custom, Newport convertibles and hardtops..	53.65
Basic, New Yorker except wagons.....	223.30
Basic, New Yorker wagons.....	206.00
Air conditioner, single and dual, respectively.....	414.55-618.40
Auto pilot.....	86.10
Console.....	129.10
Console and power trunk lid release.....	140.25
Sure-grip differential.....	51.70
Tinted glass (all).....	43.10
Power brakes (standard on New Yorker and 300 L).....	47.80
Power door locks (4-door, on all but 300 L).....	56.00
Power seat, 6-way (not available all models).....	101.90
Power seat, bucket type, 4-way.....	157.80
Power steering.....	107.60
Power windows.....	107.60
Power antenna.....	25.90
AM radios.....	92.80-146.70
AM-FM radio.....	157.00-174.30
Luggage rack, wagons.....	99.00
Adjustable steering wheel.....	46.65
Windshield washer and variable speedwipers.....	19.75
IMPERIAL CROWN AND LEBARON	
No engine option; automatic transmission, power steering, and power brakes standard.	
Optional equipment:	
Air conditioning, single and dual, respectively.....	461.95-649.85
Automatic headlight dimmer.....	46.00
Auto pilot.....	96.80
Remote control trunk lid release.....	28.80
Sure-grip differential.....	57.45
Tinted glass (all).....	53.75
Headrests, left and right.....	45.60
Power seat, 6-way.....	124.80
Power door locks, 2- and 4-door, respectively.....	47.40-72.10
AM radio, power antenna and rear seat speaker.....	168.80
AM-FM radio, power antenna and rear seat speaker.....	195.70
Adjustable steering wheel.....	51.30
Trim options.....	91.20-596.10

## THE VIETNAM SITUATION

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD] is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, a great deal of attention has been given to an interview which took place between me and an Associated Press reporter, Mr. Richard Powers, concerning the Vietnam situation.

So that my colleagues will understand specifically what was discussed and the position set forth by me in this interview, I have asked for this time to clarify the matter.

Mr. Powers is a Midwest regional reporter for the Associated Press and as such is in contact with me on a continuing basis. As the result of one of our discussions, which was in the nature of an interview, Mr. Powers ran a story on the regional wire. This was picked up in abbreviated form and carried on the national wire. As a result, many members of the press called my office to obtain a copy of my remarks. In view of the interest, a statement was prepared on the basis of the Powers' discussion and released to the press on June 14, 1965.

At this point, Mr. Speaker, I insert the statement, dated June 14, 1965, issued by my office, in the RECORD:

We may be dangerously close to ending Republican support of our present Vietnam policy. This possibility exists because the American people do not know how far the administration is prepared to go with large-scale use of ground forces in order to save face in Vietnam.

The American people deserve an answer to this question. The Republican Party should base its future support on the nature of that answer.

In the absence of this answer, we can only conclude that present policy is aimed not at victory over the Communist insurgency nor at driving Communists out of South Vietnam but rather at some sort of negotiated settlement which would include Communist elements in a coalition government.

If such is the objective of the Johnson administration, then the charge can be leveled that this administration is overcommitting ground forces in this area of the world and needlessly exposing the lives of thousands of American boys.

In several public utterances, administration spokesmen have implied that the ground force buildup in Vietnam is Eisenhower or Republican policy. Such an implication is just the opposite of the truth.

The Eisenhower-Dulles policy scrupulously avoided a large-scale use of conventional ground forces in southeast Asia. As a matter of fact, at the time President Eisenhower left office, there were only 773 members of the U.S. military mission in Vietnam, and the situation at that time was much less critical than it is now, although we have more than 50,000 American troops there today. Indications are that the American troop buildup in Vietnam could go as high as 100,000 American boys.

Well over 2 years ago, interested free world Asian countries offered to assist U.S. efforts in that area of the world. This aid included the offer of ground troops and other assistance from such countries as South Korea, Formosa, and Thailand. This aid was rejected by the United States at that time.

Today, thousands of American boys are fighting a war and many are losing their lives because the U.S. Government has failed on occasion after occasion to make the right decision at the right time.

If our objective is a negotiated settlement, it is time to use other means than the needless sacrifice of American lives to attain that objective. Once American troops are committed in any situation, a top priority objective must be to take those steps necessary to protect American lives and minimize the number of casualties.

One such step, already long overdue, is to retarget our bombing raids on more significant targets in North Vietnam. A major transportation and supply area is the port city of Haiphong. To continue to allow the unhindered flow of war materials in and out of that area only insures greater American

casualties in future Vietcong offensive actions.

Republicans will continue to support President Johnson when his actions in the Vietnamese situation serve American and free world interests and when they do not needlessly waste or endanger American lives.

As can be seen from a reading of the statement, my principal objective was to question sincerely and seriously the large-scale commitment of American lives to bring about a political settlement of the war.

Many have interpreted my remarks as a call for a total military victory in Vietnam. In point of fact, my statement did not address itself to the wisdom or folly of the President's stated objectives in Vietnam. It merely stated what seems to be an obvious conclusion that the President's policy is to obtain some sort of a negotiated settlement and it questioned the means the President appears to be taking to bring about negotiations.

To place this in perspective, let me make clear that it is my conviction that prior to the President's Baltimore speech of April 7, 1965, there were three options available to the United States in Vietnam: First, a military victory; second, a negotiated settlement; and third, withdrawal.

Since the President's very clear implications in his Baltimore speech in which he called for unconditional discussions, the options available to the United States have been reduced to two: a negotiated settlement or withdrawal.

This reduction to two options with its consequent ruling out of the option of a military victory is clearly deductible from the stated position of the President of the United States. My statement of June 14 did not address itself to the merits of the President's decision to rule out military victory as one of the options available to the United States. Rather, it concerned itself solely with the wisdom of the means the President is using to bring about his own stated objective of negotiations.

My statement of June 14 merely sought to question the wisdom of the large-scale use of American troops to bring about a political end when other means are clearly available.

It is my firm conviction that since we are bearing the brunt of world criticism anyway because of the President's decision to go north with air strikes, logic would seem to dictate that we make more effective use of these air strikes than we have to date in order to bring about the political objectives of the administration. I find it extremely difficult—as I am sure the American people do—to justify sacrificing American lives to attain political objectives when other means are available.

As suggested in my statement, it would seem far more logical to hit more significant military targets in our attempts to convince the Communists that it would be in their best interests to sit down with us at the conference table.

Mr. Speaker, on the morning of June 17, I participated in an interview on NBC's "Today Show" with Sander Van-

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ocur in which my views on the Vietnamese situation were again discussed.

Under unanimous consent, I place the interview on the "Today Show" in the RECORD at this point.

The interview referred to follows:

## CONGRESSMAN MELVIN LAIRD IS INTERVIEWED

HUGH DOWNS: In Washington, Congressman MELVIN LAIRD, chairman of the Republican conference in the House, said that he doubts the wisdom of giving full Republican support with no questions asked, to President Johnson's Vietnam policy. LAIRD suggests the Republicans should come up with their own policy for Vietnam, rather than following the administration down the line.

Congressman LAIRD is in our Washington studios this morning with "Today" program's Washington correspondent, Sander Vanocur. Gentlemen:

(Congressman MELVIN LAIRD and Sander Vanocur are seen on TV screen; seated in studio.)

VANOCUR. Good morning, Hugh. Congressman LAIRD, why have you come to this position now where you suggest that the Republicans who have supported the President on Vietnam are now, as you put it, perilously close to giving up that support?

Congressman LAIRD. Well, Sander, I'd just like to say that we in the Republican Party in the House of Representatives I think have gone the extra step to support the President of the United States as far as the southeast Asia war is concerned. GERRY FORD, LES ARENDS, myself, and the other leaders of the House of Representatives on the minority side, have always gone the extra step to support the President of the United States, and we still support the firm action of the President in Vietnam. There are serious questions, however, as to whether we are fighting the proper kind of war, and there are questions about the future, and I believe that we in the minority party have a responsibility and duty to address to the President of the United States, and discuss from one end of this country to the other.

The President chose, back late last year, to escalate the war as he has done to the use of bombing raids to the north, using air power. Now, the President is choosing to escalate the war on the ground in Vietnam. Personally, I think that this is the poorest choice of escalation that the President could possibly make, because we are choosing the very area where the Red Chinese, whom we are confronted with, and we have a confrontation with them in southeast Asia at the present time, are the strongest. And to imply that this is the policy of the former Republican administration, as a high administration spokesman did this past week, to accelerate and to escalate the ground war in Vietnam, is not the case, because the Eisenhower-Dulles policy was just the opposite, that we should not tie down large-scale ground forces in southeast Asia.

VANOCUR. Well, Congressman LAIRD, your statement of Monday seemed to suggest that the administration was remiss in not seeking total victory. Do you believe there is such a thing as total victory in that kind of a war?

LAIRD. Well, first I'd like to say that there were three alternatives available to the United States prior to the Baltimore speech of the President. One of them was military victory, the win policy that Secretary McNamara outlined to the Defense Appropriations Committee on which I serve, in March. And this was the objective and the policy of the United States in March in the testimony of the Secretary of Defense.

VANOCUR. May I interrupt you just a second?

LAIRD. Yes.

VANOCUR. Did he say in that testimony that the United States could win the war?

LAIRD. Yes, and that was the objective of the United States in southeast Asia and Vietnam. The second alternative, of course, was a negotiated settlement, and the third alternative was to withdraw. But after the Baltimore speech of President Johnson, in which he said our objective was to negotiate a settlement, he gave that implied implication to the world that that was our objective as far as Vietnam was concerned, then there were only two alternatives left to us: a negotiated settlement or withdrawal. You cannot talk about military victory in Vietnam when you already have established your policy objective as a negotiated settlement, and this is the objective now of the administration, if they have an objective. It seems to me that they have not been fair with the American people, or fair with even those of us in Congress, by not clearly setting forth their short-term aims, and long-term objectives as far as Vietnam is concerned.

VANOCUR. What would be the aims of a Republican administration; what would be your aims in Vietnam?

LAIRD. Well, I personally think that we cannot go back on the established policy set forth by the President of the United States as far as his Baltimore speech is concerned. So we cannot repudiate this position that has been taken by the leader of our country, and I do not want to be in a position at any time where I will cause the Red Chinese or the Soviet Union to miscalculate the intentions of the United States of America to defend freedom throughout the world. Now, our objective as stated by the President in his Baltimore speech now is for a negotiated settlement. It seems to me that the North Vietnamese are not interested in negotiations today, because they feel that they are winning the war. Now if we choose, as the President has chosen, to escalate the war along the ground, I believe we are choosing the area in which the North Vietnamese and the Red Chinese are the strongest, and I do not feel that that is the best way to bring about this objective that has been set forth by the President. Since the President decided to escalate the war in the air back late last year, we have not hit any significant military targets in North Vietnam. We have gotten the criticism throughout the world for our bombing raids that we knew we would get, and we expect this from certain quarters, but we have not hit any significant military targets. We have allowed the Soviet Union to bring military personnel into North Vietnam to establish SAM sites; we have the Haiphong port in which large scale military shipments are coming in at this very time, and we have not done anything about stopping these particular shipments, either by a sea blockade of this particular port, or by using any of the raids to knock out this very great movement of military supplies and equipment.

VANOCUR. But let's be candid. Doesn't this put you in a very enviable position for 1966, that if the war escalates on the ground, you can say, "We in the Republican Party were against escalating the war, we didn't want American boys killed, and yet we were firmer than President Johnson about opposing the North Vietnamese?"

LAIRD. Well, first I'd like to say that when I talk about these matters, I'm speaking as a member, a minority member, of the Defense Appropriations Committee. I do not know what the policy of my party will be in 1966's political campaign as far as this is concerned. But I'm sure that Republicans will be responsible in this area; they will put their country first and their party second, regardless of how that affects the political election. But I believe that discussion and dissent is important today in this area of foreign policy, particularly as we go forward and set future policies as far as it affects southeast Asia.

VANOCUR. Now, what does this do to your position vis-a-vis the Senate Republican

block. Now, is Senator DIRKSEN following the policies which you have advocated, have you discussed them with him?

LAIRD. I do not believe that there is any difference between my position and that of a majority of the Republicans in the House and in the U.S. Senate. I know that I talked with my leader in the House of Representatives, Congressman GERRY FORD, who's doing an outstanding job as our new leader in the House of Representatives, and there is no disagreement between Congressman Ford and myself. As a matter of fact, we work together in this particular area, and I have been in constant touch with Congressman FORD. Today we're filing the Defense appropriation report on the appropriation bill for 1966. We do not feel that the administration has faced up to its responsibilities even in this area. They have cut back on the amount of Defense requests, money requested for fiscal year 1966, so they could fund some other programs and come in with a budget under \$100 billion. I know, as a member of this committee, that they'll have to come with supplemental appropriations during this year, to fund this Vietnam situation. They've already had to come with one for \$700 million in 1965. They will have to come after January for further supplemental requests. They got the public reaction of a budget under \$100 billion, they knew that Congress couldn't refuse to give them the funds to carry on the Vietnam war and we will give them these funds. But I think the American people should be advised of the fact that these supplemental requests for defense expenditures are forthcoming and the \$100 billion budget figure was really a phoney when it was submitted in January.

VANOCUR. Congressman, at what point will the Republican Party in Congress, at what point in commitment of men to Vietnam, do you think the Republican Party will say, we can no longer support this? Will this eventuality come to pass?

LAIRD. Well, this is a very difficult question, Sander, to answer, because when it comes to the point, now is the time to question the commitment of ground forces in South Vietnam. I do not believe we want to be in a position if the President goes forward and commits several hundred thousand men to Vietnam—and it looks now like we're already programming a hundred thousand men there—I do not believe we want to be in the position at any time to cause any miscalculation on the part of the Soviet Union or the Red Chinese as to the intentions of the United States of America. This is important. So, to give you a time element in this area, I think it would be a grave mistake, as far as I'm concerned.

VANOCUR. Thank you very much, Congressman MELVIN LAIRD, of Wisconsin, a very powerful member of the House Republican group.

Mr. Speaker, it is my sincere hope that this discussion has served to clarify exactly what I was talking about in my attempts to discharge my responsibility as a member of the minority party. It is, after all, the duty of the minority party to insure that legitimate public discussion of administration policies—both foreign and domestic—take place on a continuing basis in the interests of keeping the American people fully informed about public and important issues.

## THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from

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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, statistics tell only a part of the story. I believe that one of the most helpful of many articles on monetary policy that have appeared in recent months appeared yesterday in the Chicago Sun-Times. It was written by Edwin Darby, the Sun-Times financial editor.

Mr. Darby points out that as one talks to bankers and moves around in financial circles, he obtains more of a picture of what is happening to our economy. He writes:

Under "gentle" pressure from the Federal Reserve, as one top drawer Chicago banker puts it, many banks are now rationing money.

Mr. Darby writes:

The marginal borrower may be in trouble. He's the fellow who walks into the bank wondering if his banker really is a friend. Maybe there's a blot on his credit record. Maybe a really tough look at the profit-and-loss statement of his company reveals a questionable intent or two. He's the one who is getting a turndown today, instead of the bundle of cash he would have carted away not too long ago.

This doesn't mean that the banks are actively discouraging business. It just means that they are being more selective, less aggressive in loaning money.

One Chicago banker summed up the change in attitude with this example: "A year ago, maybe, we'd get a chance to participate in a \$5 million deal. We'd be offered a \$2 million position. Maybe then we'd have tried to get our participation increased to \$3 million. If we were offered the exact same deal today, it wouldn't surprise me at all if we refused to take the proffered \$2 million and finally agreed more or less reluctantly to go for \$1 million."

Another banker uses this rather awkward, but accurate, language to describe the prevailing situation: "I'd say there's been a cooling off in the eagerness of the banks to put out money."

This represents a monetary tightening which could lead to a leveling off of our prosperity and could counteract the stimulation of the excise tax cuts; and could also, possibly, result, especially when combined with what is happening overseas, in a recession.

I do not believe that it will result in anything more serious. The major part of my remarks earlier related to the disquieting similarities between the present time and 1929. Those similarities are not likely to lead to another depression because of the clear determination on the part of our Government to act and to act decisively; and it is doing so with far greater knowledge than officials of the Government had before.

I ask unanimous consent that the article by Edwin Darby, Sun-Times financial editor appear at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE SUPPLY OF MONEY TIGHTENS

(By Edwin Darby)

At the moment William McChesney Martin is running the country. The talk coming out of Washington is of a "clash," a "battle," between Federal Reserve Chairman Martin and the President of the United States. But the reality down in the marketplace is tightening money. That's not the way President Johnson wants it. It is the way Chairman Martin wants it.

Tight money, easy money. It is a matter of degree and gradual change. Except possibly in an emergency the light doesn't blink from full green to red. Right now it can't be said that we have tight money. We have tightening money.

The bankers are the people who can tell you what's really going on. In the business of buying and selling a standard commodity known as money, they know the day-to-day condition of the market and they feel the effects of high policy decisions in Washington.

Under "gentle" pressure from the Federal Reserve, as one top drawer Chicago banker puts it, many banks are now rationing money. The system is informal, voluntary, on a case-by-case basis. But the effect is general: it is a little more difficult to get a bank loan now than it was 6 months ago. The borrower, individual or corporate, may have to pay a shade more to get his money. Or other terms and conditions may be a might stiffer. Or the bank may suggest a smaller loan. Or turn down a loan altogether that it might well have made in the past.

#### MARGINAL TROUBLE

The marginal borrower may be in trouble. He's the fellow who walks into the bank wondering if his banker really is a friend. Maybe there's a blot on his credit record. Maybe a really tough look at the profit and loss statement of his company reveals a questionable item or two. He's the one who is getting a turndown today, instead of the bundle of cash he would have carted away not too long ago.

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Another banker uses this rather awkward, but accurate, language to describe the prevailing situation: "I'd say there's been a cooling off in the eagerness of the banks to put out money."

The Prentice-Hall Executive Report bulletin uses this formal language in offering businessmen advice on what Chairman Martin's policy may mean to them, and to their corporations:

"It all adds up to a more difficult period ahead for the money, credit, and stock markets. All firms should review their expansion, modernization, or other projects requiring borrowed funds."

But one Chicago banker says "no one has been hurt, yet." By that he means that the established business community is able to get the money it needs. Funds are being furnished by the banks to their regular customers on much the same basis as before.

#### PRESSURE, BUT LITTLE CHANGE

There may be pressure to raise interest rates and some customers may be paying a fractionally higher rate of interest. But the general rate level has not changed.

Here's the way one banker sees the interest-rate picture at the moment: "Many banks are trying to get better rates. But they are not having much luck. You see a little creeping up in rates, but even though the banking system is taut now there's not enough tightness to make possible across-the-board increases. Our rates still have to be competitive. There's absolutely no chance of an increase in the prime interest rate (now  $4\frac{1}{2}$  percent) now or in the immediate future."

Bankers with a broad knowledge of the economy and of monetary policy go along with Chairman Martin's present posture, a little tightening up. While President Johnson gets ready to sign the excise tax reduction bill with expressions of hope that it will help keep the economy booming along, the banking community generally sides with Martin's belief that the economy can stand a little tightening and remain strong.

Martin's objectives: First and foremost, to add a stronger interest-rate pattern to the direct controls now being used by the administration in the balance-of-payments pattern. Second, to tighten money a little now as a long-range hedge against the possibility of a new boomtime inflationary threat.

HANOI, NOT UNITED STATES, KEEP-  
ING UNITED STATES OUT OF U.N.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, many people throughout the country and many Senators have suggested that we should turn our Vietnam problem over to the United Nations.

The suggestion that the United Nations might resolve the Vietnam situation as it did problems in Lebanon and the Congo is based on a misconception of the alleged similarities of those situations. South Vietnam is geographically contiguous to a Communist state, which is actively promoting armed attacks against the Government and people of South Vietnam. The "internal security problem" in South Vietnam is not a result of the complete breakdown of social and legal order in that country, as was the case in the Congo. Rather, it is the result of a military action carried out by personnel trained, supplied, and directed by the North, whose objective is the forcible overthrow of the Government in the South and the communization of South Vietnam. North Vietnam is attempting to take over its southern neighbor indirectly through a so-called war of national liberation. This approach, however, is no less military than direct aggression, even though its techniques may be more subtle, more devious, and play upon unique historical and social conditions in Vietnam.

The existing peace settlements in southeast Asia—the Geneva accords of 1954 on Indochina and of 1962 on Laos—were arrived at outside the United Nations framework. To involve the United Nations in either a peace-restoring or peace-observing role in southeast Asia would require the assent of the parties concerned. This assent seems unlikely in view of Hanoi's and Peiping's attitude toward U.N. involvement. In August 1964 Hanoi rejected the U.N. Security Council's competence to consider the Tonkin Gulf incidents when the United States brought that situation before the Council. In addition, Peiping radio on April 11, 1965, said that the "Vietnam question has nothing to do with the United Nations" and that "no meddling by the United Nations is called for nor will it be tolerated."

That is the Communist position.

Finally, Hanoi's declaration of April 19 noted that it would be inappropriate for the United Nations to intervene in the Vietnam situation.

In present circumstances, it is the considered judgment of our Government

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that no consensus could be found among the members of the Security Council or the General Assembly in support of a proposal to establish a United Nations peacekeeping force in Vietnam. This is not to say, of course, that the United Nations has no value in meeting certain of the problems of southeast Asia. For instance, the Secretary-General has indicated his availability as a channel for discussion of a peaceful solution in Vietnam. We appreciate his suggestions and hope that the channel will remain open.

The United Nations is already deeply involved in international development programs in southeast Asia, with 9 U.N. agencies represented in South Vietnam and 12 U.N. agencies involved in the planning and early operating stages of the Mekong Coordinating Committee. President Johnson, in his speech of April 7 at Johns Hopkins, expressed the hope that the Secretary-General could initiate with the countries of southeast Asia a plan for increased development. The President also pledged \$1 billion in support of this undertaking. Mr. Eugene Black was subsequently designated the President's special representative and has already held consultations with United Nations officials.

Nor do we exclude the possibility that if, as, and when there is a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam, the United Nations might well sponsor peacekeeping machinery which could be useful in assuring that all parties kept faith with that settlement.

#### TYDINGS EXCELLENT MAIDEN SPEECH AGAINST ROTTEN BOROUGH

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, in the June 14th issue of Newsweek, Kenneth Crawford highly praised the distinguished junior Senator from Maryland on his maiden speech in the Senate. This article points out how well Senator Tydings' speech exposed the fallacies of the Dirksen reapportionment amendment. Senator Tydings is also to be commended for the intensive work that he did in the Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee which held hearings on the bill. His comprehensive speech reflects his work in interviewing many witnesses as a member of the subcommittee.

Kenneth Crawford points out that the Dirksen bill is losing support. He says in the article:

What has happened in these weeks to change the outlook is that the Court's defenders have made mincemeat of most of the attackers' arguments.

Crawford compares Senator DIRKSEN's reapportionment amendment to a football game and names some of the players the defensive team that is protecting the "one man-one vote" principle. My colleague, Senator CLARK, will be pleased to know that he is rated as one of the stars of the team. Senator DOUGLAS is referred to as the team pro while Senator KENNEDY of New York and Senator TYDINGS are "some of the fastest of the young talent." Many more of my colleagues are on the team and many more are joining.

These Senators have realized the impact of this "rotten borough" amendment on the civil rights cause. If some States have used primaries, literacy tests, and poll taxes to disenfranchise the citizen, what would happen if these same legislatures could reapportion one of their houses on the basis of factors other than population? This is something that could happen in any part of the country. It would be ironic if this body, having previously passed the historic voting rights bill, were to pass the Dirksen amendment which would limit the rights of citizens.

Kenneth Crawford and many others across the Nation have read and highly praised Senator Tydings' speech against the rotten borough amendment. I hope that the proponents of this bill will again read Senator Tydings' speech in order that they may reconsider their opposition to the fundamental principle of "one man-one vote."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, immediately following my remarks this article by Kenneth Crawford.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE BIG GAME

(By Kenneth Crawford)

They are choosing up sides in the Senate for the reapportionment game, which will be to this congressional session what the Rose Bowl game is to the collegiate football season. One side will defend the Supreme Court's goal: to give every voter an equal voice in the composition of the State legislatures. The other side will attack this principle.

CLARK, of Pennsylvania, is one of the stars of the defending team, already has threatened to use filibuster tactics, which he normally disapproves but considers justified in this case because the stakes are so high. DOUGLAS, of Illinois, who led a filibuster on this issue once before, is prepared to do it again. They have picked up some of the fastest of the young talent—KENNEDY of New York, who has testified for their side in committee, and TYDINGS, of Maryland, who in his rookie tryout last week delivered a brilliant speech upholding the one-man, one-vote formula.

DIRKSEN, of Illinois, the man who thought up the game and owns the ball, will lead the attackers. He wrote the proposed constitutional amendment which would in effect cancel the Court's orders by permitting States to base apportionment for one branch of their legislatures on factors "other than population." This would free the States to favor landowners over renters, whites over Negroes, or any category of voters over any other. It would tend to perpetuate present inequalities between rural and urban voters. And it might well add new injustices to the electoral system.

#### PRESIDENTIAL ALOOFNESS

DIRKSEN's players will be mostly from such southern campuses as Ole Miss and from conservative small States conscious of their smallness, protective of their equal status in the U.S. Senate and obsessed with the fallacy that State senates should follow the national example.

Either side could be reasonably sure of winning if it could recruit President Johnson. So far he has refused to play. At a recent press conference he expressed sympathy, in theory, with the Supreme Court position and its friends. But he hastily added that the President has no responsibility

in the Constitution-amending process and that he was not, as yet, taking a hand. DIRKSEN applauded the President's aloofness. He thinks he can win on his own if Mr. Johnson doesn't help the other side. And maybe he can, if he can break a filibuster.

But his prospects are not as bright as they were a few weeks ago. What has happened in these weeks to change the outlook is that the Court's defenders have made mincemeat of most of the attacker's arguments in practice committee scrimmages. They also have pointed up some of the dangers inherent in the Dirksen proposal. The most telling witness was Burke Marshall, former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division. He argued that Southern States could, and some doubtless would, use the amendment, if it were adopted, to rig their legislative districts in such a way as to minimize the potential of the Negro vote.

#### MINORITY RULE

Drawing on Marshall's expertise, TYDINGS told the Senate that DIRKSEN's rotten-borough amendment posed a clear civil rights issue. If the House passes the voting rights bill already approved by the Senate and then Congress accepts the Dirksen proposition, said TYDINGS, it will enfranchise the Negro with one hand and devalue his vote with the other.

TYDINGS also referred to the committee record to show what present malapportionment means in terms of legislation. In Missouri, for example, 83 State senators representing 1.3 million voters defeated a bill to establish a \$1-an-hour minimum wage even though 68 senators representing 2.6 million voters supported it. Similarly, in Michigan, senators speaking for 2.8 million voters beat a bill to provide children with free polo shots even though senators representing 3.2 million voters were for it.

These same minority-ridden State senates, under the Dirksen amendment, would have a large measure of control over rulemaking for the conduct of referendums to decide what other-than-population criteria were to be used in defining legislative voting districts. This, TYDINGS contends, would give the old order too much chance to cheat.

#### DRUMMOND'S EXCELLENT ARTICLES ON ISRAEL

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, Roscoe Drummond has been writing a superlative series of analysis of the Israeli economy—the contributions of this remarkable little country to peace and the serious threat it faces from the Arab league.

In a recent article Mr. Drummond argues for a reconciliation between the Arab League and Israel and points out what a boon such a reconciliation would be for the Arab world as well as for everyone else. As he writes, "17 years have passed since Israel was established and she is not being crushed and is not going to be crushed."

But the immense burden of arms on the depressed, struggling Arab economies and on the more prosperous but still heavily burdened Israel is not only a serious threat to peace in the Middle East, but also it is the single most depressing economic factor in the lives of these millions of struggling people.

I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "Outmatching Arabs; Israel Is Way Ahead," by Roscoe Drummond, published in the Washington Post on June 18, be printed at this point in the RECORD.